The Force of Law: Genetic Data Protection in Central and Eastern Europe by Petra Bard
95
JAHR  Vol. 1  No. 1  2010
Petra Bárd*
Th e Force of Law: Genetic Data 
Protection in Central and Eastern 
Europe
ABSTRACT
During the past decade the collection and processing of human biological samples and that of 
related data gained an increasingly important role in both medical research and the forensic 
fi eld. Th e European Union legislator tried to keep up with this phenomenon, and attempted 
to reconcile freedom of research in the classical biobank context and the principle of avail-
ability in the criminal context with European Union-wide data protection safeguards. In 
the lack of a suffi  ciently homogeneous legal framework European jurisdictions greatly diff er 
in regulating the protection of genetic data. Two main country groups can be identifi ed: 
Member States can be grouped along the question whether they have or do not have specifi c 
biobank laws. In countries that do have such laws, comparison is easier, and they are following 
international standards. Whenever such specifi c laws are lacking, not only the identifi cation 
of the respective legal rules, but also their comparison is diffi  cult, since the interpretation of 
these vague and more general laws is left to the stakeholders, law enforcement agencies, and 
fi nally to the judiciary. Since in this latter group of countries however relevant judicial cases 
are very rare, the interpretation of the codes and other comprehensive laws happens on an 
ad hoc basis, and remains invisible. Th e diff ering legal and ethical issues concerning patients’ 
data in the classical context, and suspects’, convicts’, victims’ and other persons’ data protec-
tion in a forensic context will be addressed in light of the 2003 International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data. Actual examples from Central European jurisdictions will highlight 
the related theoretical and practical problems both in terms of bioethical research and forensic 
sciences on the one hand and data protection and privacy on the other.
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In the present paper I will discuss the existing regulatory framework of biobanks 
across the European Union focusing on the collection and analysis of legislation and 
regulation regarding the establishment, management and functioning of classical, 
population and forensic biobanks across Europe focusing on Central Eastern Euro-
pean Member States. 
It is worth considering the international instruments applicable and binding even in 
lack of national regulation of the matter, as there is a great diversity as to biobank 
laws and related legislation across Europe. Moreover many countries do not have 
any biobank laws, and in a number of Central Eastern European states one has to 
rely on laws of diverse nature that serve as background pieces of legislation applica-
ble to biobanks. Th ese laws may include acts, statues or other pieces of legislation 
on health care, data protection, privacy, patients’ rights, medical research, or even 
comprehensive codes, such as the Civil Code or the Criminal Code. Since in the 
majority of the Member States there is no specifi c law with a matching title, it is of-
ten a problem for biologists, doctors or even ethicists to identify the proper docu-
ments. Even if the laws are identifi ed, the relevant parts have to be found and the 
often too general provisions need to be applied to the specifi c case of biobanks.
Before going into the merits and discussing the international and domestic pieces of 
legislation applicable to biobanks, there is a preliminary issue to be clarifi ed: how we 
defi ne, what we exactly understand under the term biobank. Th e issue of biobanks 
and the legal and ethical considerations surrounding them are rather novel, there-
fore it should not come as a surprise that there is no widely recognized international 
defi nition. As a natural consequence domestic jurisdictions greatly diff er in the defi -
nition and regulation of biobanks. In the lack of a common denominator, all divi-
sions seem to be arbitrary and therefore should be treated carefully and in a fl exible 
manner. 
One may diff erentiate population biobanks receiving supplies in an organized man-
ner, containing biological materials and personal data and established to supply bio-
logical materials or data derived therefrom for multiple future research projects from 
research biobanks developed by and restricted to authorized clinical investigations at 
academic medical centers. Th ese databases contain genetics and other biomedical 
information about connecting individual patients derived from their clinically col-
lected tissues, with the electronic data sometimes being transmitted to a central da-
tabase. Although sometimes discussed jointly with classical biobanking, forensic da-
tabases greatly diff er in nature from the above classical and population biobanks. In 
the broad sense forensic databases are DNA databanks held by authorized laborato-
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ries of police and offi  cial forensic institutions for criminal and other legal proce-
dures, such as the identifi cation of victims, missing persons, perpetrators, the estab-
lishment or rejection of paternity, etc. Th ere is a qualitative diff erence in the legal 
sense between the classical and population biobanks on the one hand, and forensic 
biobanks on the other.1 Th e former group invokes questions such as whether the 
collection or storage of data are free, or whether donors are remunerated, whether 
consent is needed and what amounts to informed consent, or the way withdrawal 
happens. Th ese questions do not make sense in the context of forensic databanks, 
where the question much rather is whether coercion can be used for data collection, 
and whether tissues, cells and connected data are destroyed once the purpose of the 
collection (identifi cation of perpetrator, identifi cation of victims, etc.) are fulfi lled.
In the following the division between population and classical biobanks on the one 
hand, and forensic databanks on the other will be maintained, as they raise entirely 
distinct legal issues. In Part 2 the former group of biobanks will be addressed start-
ing with international legal sources and then going into the Central European speci-
fi cities,, while in Part 3 the specifi c and distinct legal issues concerning forensic da-
tabanks will be discussed. In relation to both types of genetic databanks 
recommendations follow the legal analysis. 
2. Classical biobanks
International legal sources
When mapping relevant international legal sources it is worth starting with the 
UNESCO documents. UNESCO has adopted three declarations concerning bio-
ethics, the Universal Declaration of Human Genome and Human Rights (1997), 
the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003) and the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005).
Th e »Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine« opened for signature in 
April 1997 is known as the Oviedo Convention. It came into force in December 
1999 and was ratifi ed by 34 Member States in February 2009. Th is is the fi rst and 
only binding instrument that explicitly links human rights and bioethics. On sever-
al occasions the European Court of Human Rights has based legal decisions on 
1 In most of the jurisdictions samples are only stored from unresolved crimes or crime scenes, and suspects’ or 
convicts’ samples are destroyed once the profi le has been derived therefrom. Th erefore forensic biobanks typically 
contain less samples than genetic profi les, if any, and accordingly a legitimate debate evolved as to whether they 
may be called genebanks or not. Keeping this debate in mind, and acknowledging its relevance I would like to 
stress that in the present paper the phrase »forensic biobank« refers to both databanks including samples and pro-
fi les, and also repositories only including one or the other. 
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the Oviedo Convention, including cases where the states had not ratifi ed, or even 
signed the Convention. 
Four Additional Protocols have been adopted on the following topics: the Prohibi-
tion of Cloning Human Beings (1998), the Transplantation of Organs and Tissues 
of Human Origin (2002), Biomedical Research (2005) and Genetic Testing for 
Health Purposes (2008). 
Perhaps the most specifi c among all the texts adopted within the Council of Europe 
is the Recommendation (2006) 4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States 
on research on biological materials of human origin. In its Preamble the Recom-
mendation states that »population biobanks developed on the basis of donations of 
biological materials made in a spirit of solidarity should not be monopolized by 
small groups of researchers.« Th e Recommendation provides basic rules for obtain-
ing biological materials, access to and oversight of biobanks. Article 4 promotes the 
establishment of codes of good practice to ensure compliance with this Recommen-
dation.
As a background legislation the comprehensive Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms shall also be mentioned.
In addition to legal sources numerous professional bodies adopted in the fi eld of 
biobanks.2 
Among the primary sources of European Union law, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union of 2000 is to be mentioned. Th e Charter can be re-
garded as the Bill of Rights of the European Union, but opposed to most national 
constitutions listing fundamental rights, it is a novel document, therefore it is rather 
progressive. Article 1 on human dignity, and more specifi cally Article 3 on the right 
to the integrity of the person are of great relevance.
2 Th e European Science Foundation extensively dealt with and formulated recommendations for »Population 
Surveys and Biobanking« in its May 2008 Science Policy Briefi ng.
In 2004, a group of experts including those working in the fi elds of human genetics, sociologists, university re-
searchers, the industry, patient organisations and the European Parliament published a report commissioned by 
the European Commission with 25 recommendations on ethical, legal and social aspects of genetic testing. Among 
these, six focused on biobanks and issues related to research. 
In 2001, the European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) published a background document discussing tech-
nical, social and ethical issues and a set of recommendations concerning data storage and DNA banking for 
biomedical research. 
Th e OECD Working Party on Biotechnology was developing Council Guidelines on human biobanks and genetic 
research databases through an expert group of member countries. A background document with the title »Creation 
and Governance of Human Genetic Research Databases« came out already in October 2006.
An early document of the Human Genome Organization is also noteworthy. Th e HUGO Ethics Committee 
published a Statement on DNA Sampling: Control and Access already back in February 1998.
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As to the sources of secondary legislation, the following documents are relevant: 
Regulation 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free move-
ment of such data, Directive 2006/86/EC implementing Directive 2004/23/EC as 
regards traceability requirements, notifi cation of serious adverse reactions and events 
and certain technical requirements for the coding, processing, preservation, storage 
and distribution of human tissues and cells, Directive 2006/17/EC implementing 
Directive 2004/23/EC as regards certain technical requirements for the donation, 
procurement and testing of human tissues and cells, Directive 2005/62/EC imple-
menting Directive 2002/98/EC as regards Community standards and specifi cations 
relating to a quality system for blood establishments, Directive 2005/61/EC imple-
menting Directive 2002/98/EC as regards traceability requirements and notifi cation 
of serious adverse reactions and events, Directive 2004/33/EC of 22 March 2004 
implementing Directive 2002/98/EC as regards certain technical requirements for 
blood and blood components, Directive 2004/23/EC on setting standards of quali-
ty and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, storage and distri-
bution of human tissues and cells, Directive 2002/98/EC setting standards of quali-
ty and safety for the collection, testing, processing, storage and distribution of 
human blood and blood components and amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Direc-
tive 2001/20/EC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States relating to the implementation of good clinical 
practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, Di-
rective 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, and fi nally 
Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
Th e European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) is also 
highly authoritative in questions related to biobanking. Almost all of its opinion are 
to be taken into account, just to name a few Opinion n°19 on the ethical aspects of 
umbilical cord blood banking, Opinion n°15 on ethical aspects of human stem cell 
research and use, and Opinion n°11 on the ethical aspects of human tissue banking 
are of great relevance. Th e Article 29 Data Protection Working Party adopted a 
Working Document on Genetic Data on 17 March 2004.
Mapping biobanks in CEE
Biobanks are nationally regulated, through a combination of general and specifi c 
laws and oversight bodies. Th e laws diff er greatly from one another, their scopes 
greatly vary and extend from small scale sample collections to large population 
100
JAHRVol. 1No. 12010
based databases. Th e confusion between data and sample frequently result in the 
duality of legal norms; while the collection, storage of biological samples are gov-
erned by laws on biomedicine, the data derived from the samples are subject of the 
data protection law. Even legal experts in the fi eld seem to be ambiguous about the 
applicability of other legal norms such as law on biomedical research, organ and tis-
sue transplantation, law on genetics, legal norms on patients’ rights and on data 
protection. Most institutions have no written policies or agreements regarding this 
activity, and even if there was a willingness on the side of hospitals, clinics and re-
search institutes to adjust their practice to some general norms, researchers or draft-
ers of these internal guidelines are in an extremely diffi  cult position due to the large 
number of international, national, and professional guidelines that contain diff er-
ent, sometimes even contradicting recommendations relevant for biobanks.
Probably the most crucial legal issues to be clarifi ed are data protection and anony-
mization. Many important contemporary biobanks use a form of reversible ano-
nymisation, or – with another terminology – pseudonymisation, because this is a 
way to assure protection while keeping a link to be able to update information and 
to re-contact participants whenever information valuable to the donors is discov-
ered. Th is is the only way to ensure feedback which is a fundamental reason for 
many donors to participate in genetic research. Th e next logical step is to determine 
what kinds of pseudonymisation techniques are adequate: double coding, single 
coding or some other method. Even if one named a certain technique, a lack of con-
sensus on the defi nition prevents researchers from agreeing on standardisation. Pro-
fessor Bernice Elger proved the varied nature of the many terms. In the tower of 
Babel of terms – as she called it – one can fi nd references to samples that are anony-
mous, anonymised, anonymously coded, coded, unidentifi ed, de-linked, perma-
nently de-linked, not traceable, unlinked, identifi ably linked, pseudonomised, en-
coded, encrypted, directly identifi ed, confi dential, identifi able, not traceable, or in 
the UNESCO terminology: linked to an identifi able person. Diff erent legal families 
adhere to distinct legal traditions, and prefer one or another term over others for le-
gal historical reasons. Sometimes even the same term is used with a diff erent mean-
ing, like the words »anonymised« and »coded« which are fi lled with diff erent con-
tent in Continental and common law jurisdictions.3 
Putting these terminological discrepancies apart, the main controversy is evolved 
around the question how to assure adequate anonymisation – be it linked or un-
linked. Th is issue can be subdivided into diff erent narrower questions, like in which 
form should samples/DNA be stored, used, who shall decide which degree of ano-
3 Bernice Elger’s presentation at the Tiss.EU Workshop organized by CELAB between 6-8 April, 2009 in Buda-
pest at the Central European University.
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nymisation is adequate, how many characteristics must be stripped to obtain truly 
irreversible or reversible anonymisation, and what are the standards for technical 
questions of security. 
Apart from data protection and anonymisation, the issue of informed consent is a 
fundamental problem to be addressed in an ideal biobank-related legislation. Both 
the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki incorporate the principle of 
informed consent as a pillar in the practice of bioethics. Informed consent allows 
individuals to exercise their fundamental right to decide whether, and how, their 
body, body parts and associated data can be used in research. Th e principle of in-
formed consent is applicable for any research on human beings or on human mate-
rial and as it follows even in the lack of specifi c legal norm it should be applicable in 
the fi eld of biobanks as well. As biobank projects are costly and often envisage the 
multiple use of the samples biobank operators are inventive as to the consent mod-
els. One consent type proposed by the Human Genome Organisation in 1998, 
namely presumed consent, is clearly favoured less often than the others. Estonia ap-
plies the so-called open consent model, which does not specify the research in which 
samples and data are used and applies a general consent form. Th is model may be 
corrected with the conditional consent model (in which a person may exclude in 
advance certain types of research use). 
One of the most debated issues concerning the legal framework of biobanks are the 
property rights. Th ese are often not mentioned at all in biobank law even if owner-
ship of samples constitutes a key question in biobanks with serious implications on 
commercialization. While the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of 
the Council of states that the human body and its parts shall not give rise to fi nan-
cial gain, this provision seems not to cover the data derived from the physical sam-
ples, although in practice data may be of even higher commercial asset than the 
samples themselves. At least two issues must be addressed regarding property. Th e 
fi rst is the individuals’ rights concerning their own biological material. Th e second is 
the nature of collaboration between academic researchers and private companies in 
the development of biobank research. Here, the question of ownership of the collec-
tions and intellectual property rights need to be addressed. 
Professor Judit Sándor identifi ed the good legal practices of classical and population 
biobank laws in the following.4
4 GeneBanC internal documents (manuscript on fi le with the author).
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1. Th e process should start with the clear defi nition of the goal whether the law 
should cover population based public and private biobanks or certain disease 
specifi c ones.
2. Th e law should include clear arrangement for data processing. Problematic 
points include the following: anonym data is diff erent from coded data, coded-
double coded, genetic sample, specimen, data, linking-cross-linking, transfer.
3. Certain hospitals, universities, research institutes (or their departments) have a 
sample collection and have stored cells and tissues, but the legislative or a supervi-
sory authority does not have any knowledge about it. It is therefore crucial to make 
these biobanks transparent with a corresponding obligatory registration system. 
4. Researchers in the biobanks are often unaware of the existing background legis-
lation, such as acts, statutes or lower pieces of legislation related to data protec-
tion, rules on research. Often the establishment of the biobank has not been 
preceded by a legal ethical screening and evaluation of the future operation of 
the institution. Mainly those researchers have an idea about the desirable way of 
collection, storage and process of data who participate in international, mainly 
European Union-wide consortia. 
5. Identifi cation of rights and interests of research participants, researchers and bio-
tech industry is needed: dignity-privacy-liberty; right to be informed, right to 
decide (consent); freedom of choice right to withdraw sample/data; short term 
goals; long term goals (freedom of research); biobanks are often seen as invest-
ment in the future it poses legal challenges: validity of the consent, access to old 
collections, follow up procedure is still necessary
6. It would be crucial to develop mechanisms for biobank monitoring.
7. Th e law on new technologies often require further adjustment, corrections, 
therefore adequate follow up mechanisms are desired.
3. Forensic databanks 
International legal sources
From among the three main UNESCO Declarations mentioned above, the second 
one, the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data of 2003 might be of 
relevance. Th e main focus of the document however is not on the forensic use of 
genetic information, but primarily on genetic research, the sequencing of the hu-
man genome, and its medical research and biomedical applications. 
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Beside the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms and the related case-law of the European court of Human Rights,5 Council 
of Europe member states are also bound by the Convention of 1981 for the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data. Still in the 
framework of the Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R(87)15 regulating the 
use of personal data in the police sector is even more specifi c when it comes to the 
forensic use of data. Principle 2 lays down the purposes for which data may be gath-
ered: permissible forensic purposes are the prevention of a danger, which must be 
real, or the suppression of a specifi c criminal off ence. Th e Recommendation allows 
for exceptions if provided for by national law. Th e length of storage according to 
Principle 7 should be linked to necessity, i.e. data should be deleted if no longer 
necessary for the original purposes for which they were acquired and stored. In this 
regard special attention is to be given to the following: »the need to retain data in 
the light of the conclusion of an inquiry into a particular case; a fi nal judicial deci-
sion, in particular an acquittal; rehabilitation; spent convictions; amnesties; the age 
of the data subject, particular categories of data.«
Recommendation No. R(92)1 is dealing specifi cally with the use of analysis of deox-
yribonucleic acid (DNA) within the framework of the criminal justice system. Point 
3 states that samples and profi les may only be used for the purpose of the investiga-
tion and prosecution of criminal off ences. Any contrary or additional use would be 
in violation of the law, except if samples or profi les are needed for research and sta-
tistical purposes, and if it is made sure that the identity of the individual cannot be 
ascertained, i.e. if names or other identifying references are removed prior to the 
data’s use in the extra-forensic context. Point 4 stresses the rule already existing un-
der the Convention that the circumstances of sample taking and analysis are to be 
laid down in domestic law, in some cases specifi c authorisation from a judicial au-
thority being needed. Point 8 limits the storage of samples and data: according to 
the provision they shall not be kept after a fi nal decision is rendered, except if neces-
sary for purposes that are directly linked to the original purposes for which they 
were collected. A mechanism shall be set up to ensure that samples and profi les are 
deleted when no longer necessary. A general exception from this rule is where the 
individual has been convicted of serious off ences against the life, integrity or securi-
ty of persons, in which cases strict storage periods have to be determined by domes-
tic law. Rehabilitation is an important aspect of criminal policy. Should data of per-
petrators remain in a forensic database for disproportionately long periods of time, 
5 Leander v. Sweden of 26 March 1987, Application no. 9248/81, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria of 20 June 2002, Applica-
tion no. 50963/99, Lupsa v. Romania of 8 June 2006, Application no. 10337/04, Puig Panella c. Espagne de 25 avril 
2006, Requête no 1483/02
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especially if entities other than law enforcement agencies have access to these data-
banks, the objective of rehabilitation cannot be fulfi lled. Both the Committee of 
Minsters Recommendation No. R (84) 10 on the criminal record and rehabilitation 
of convicted persons6 and Recommendation No. R (96) 8 on crime policy in Eu-
rope in a time of change are putting emphasis on the aim of rehabilitation. 
Although reference  has already been to the case-law related to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, one particular decision, S. and Marper v. the United 
Kingdom7 is worth of mention in greater detail. In this case the European Court of 
Human Rights held in a unanimous decision that the United Kingdom was in vio-
lation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, when the UK 
authorities continued to retain the Applicants’ fi ngerprints, DNA samples and pro-
fi les after criminal proceedings against them had ended with an acquittal or had 
been discontinued. Th e ECtHR adhered to its own case law when underlining that 
the mere storing of data relating to one’s private life amounts to an interference 
within the meaning of Article 8, irrespectively of the further use of the stored data.8 
According to the Court in the present case all types of stored information, i.e. fi n-
gerprints, DNA profi les and cellular samples, constituted personal data within the 
meaning of the Data Protection Convention. Th e Court acknowledged the diff er-
ence between the ways DNA and fi ngerprint storage may interfere with an individ-
ual’s privacy due to the fact that sensitive information, such as one’s ethnic origin, 
health status may be derived from genetic data. Th is diff erence however did not pre-
vent the ECtHR from concluding that all types of data in the given case did consti-
tute an interference with private life.
Th e next issue to be determined was whether such an interference was justifi ed, i.e. 
whether it was in accordance with the law, whether it pursued a legitimate aim, and 
was necessary in a democratic society. In the Court’s view the UK law can be seen as 
a clear legal basis for the interference, however the conditions under which storage 
and use are permitted, are less clear. Th e Court however did not stop the examina-
6 Also incorporated into Recital (10) of Council Decision 2005/876/JHA of 21 November 2005 on the ex-
change of information extracted from the criminal record: »Under Council of Europe Recommendation No R (84) 
10 on the criminal record and rehabilitation of convicted persons, the main aim of establishment of the criminal 
record is to inform the authorities responsible for the criminal justice system of the background of a person subject 
to legal proceedings with a view to adapting the decision to be taken to the individual situation. Since all other use 
of the criminal record that might compromise the chances of social rehabilitation of the convicted person must be 
as limited as possible, the use of information transmitted under this Decision for use otherwise than in the course 
of criminal proceedings can be limited in accordance with the national legislation of the requested State and the 
requesting State.«
7 S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom of 4 December 2008, Application numbers 30562/04 and 30566/04.
8 Leander v. Sweden of 26 March 1987, Application number 9248/81, Amman v. Switzerland of 16 February 
2000, Application number 27798/95
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tion at this point, but noted that all the issues concerning the »prescribed by law« 
requirement of the interference are closely linked to the question whether the inter-
ference in question was necessary in a democratic society. Th e Court agreed with the 
UK Government that the limitation of private life, i.e. the retention of fi ngerprints 
and DNA pursued the legitimate purposes of crime detection, identifi cation of fu-
ture off enders, and as a result crime prevention. Th e case failed at the last prong of 
the test: the limitation was not considered to be necessary in a democratic society. 
Th e Court reiterated its case law on this test: for an interference to be necessary in a 
democratic society for a legitimate aim, it must answer a pressing social need, must 
be proportionate in relation to the aim to be pursued, and the reasons for the limi-
tation must be relevant and suffi  cient. Th e Court stated that there is no suffi  cient 
link between crime scene sample matches and the retention of samples of uncon-
victed persons. Th e Court thus found the lack of an independent review mechanism 
for the justifi cation of retention, and the »blanket and indiscriminate nature of the 
power of retention,« which is irrespective of the nature and gravity of the off ence, 
unacceptable. Th e Court also remembered Article 40 Section (1) (viii) of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 on the heightened need of privacy 
protection in the criminal-justice sphere, and held that the retention of unconvicted 
persons’ data may be especially harmful if the then suspect is a minor, like S. in the 
present case who was 11 at the time his samples were taken. When entering into the 
special dangers of applying the challenged rules to children, the Court also under-
lined a fi nding of the Nuffi  eld Council, which proved the over-representation of 
young persons and ethnic minorities in the biobank. 
Th e case is interesting so much the more as several Member States seem to be in viola-
tion of Article 8 as interpreted by the ruling of the Court. Details will follow in Part 7.
As it has already been proven the European Union proved to be a promoter of the 
exchange of law enforcement information. A novel, fi fth freedom seems to be added 
to the free movements of goods, capital, services, and persons forming the basis of 
the internal market of the European Union. Already Directive 95/46/EC of 24 Oc-
tober 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of per-
sonal data and on the free movement of such data (Data Protection Directive) men-
tioned in its title the addition to the four freedoms. Since the adoption of the Data 
Protection Directive the free movement of data gained increased importance among 
others in the third pillar. Examples are Council Framework Decision 2006/960/
JHA on simplifying the exchange of information and information and intelligence 
between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union, 
or more specifi cally in the area of exchange of DNA information the Prüm Frame-
work Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, par-
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ticularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime and the implementing 
Council Decision 2008/616/JHA. 
According to the former, Member States ensure that any type of information or data 
which is held by law enforcement authorities or by public authorities or by private 
entities and which is available to law enforcement authorities without the taking of 
coercive measures are exchanged among Member States’ law enforcement authori-
ties for the purpose of conducting criminal investigations or criminal intelligence 
operations. Th e latter two instruments also contain provisions that make the ex-
change of information less burdensome on the conditions and procedure for the 
automated transfer of DNA profi les, dactyloscopic data and national vehicle regis-
tration data. 
Th e question than is what measures would balance the free fl ow of sensitive infor-
mation from a human rights perspective. 
In the framework of the European Union, the Data Protection Directive might 
seem relevant. Th e Directive reiterates Article 8 ECHR, the Data Protection Con-
vention and remembers that data protection is also among the general principles of 
Community law. Th e Data Protection Directive however is a fi rst pillar instrument 
and therefore its scope does not extend to criminal cases or criminal cooperation. In 
both Recital (13) and Article 3 (2) on the scope of the Directive it is clearly stated 
that Titles V and VI TEU on public safety, defence, state security, national criminal 
law all fall outside the scope of the Directive. 
Th e question then arises whether the recently adopted Council Framework Deci-
sion 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data proc-
essed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
(Framework Decision on Data Protection) applies to forensic biobanks. 
Unfortunately the scope of the Framework Decision itself is rather limited. Both ac-
cording to Recital (7) and Article 1 (2) there has to be a European element for the 
Framework Decision to apply. 
Th e Framework Decision entered into force in January 2009, on the 20th day fol-
lowing its publication in the Offi  cial Journal of the European Union, and Member 
States have to take the necessary measures to comply with the provisions of the law 
until 27 November 2010. 
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Mapping forensic databanks in CEE and beyond
Th e purposes of a forensic databank may vary from prosecution and the identifi ca-
tion of perpetrators to the identifi cation of victims, the identifi cation of victims in 
mass disasters (e.g. air crash or natural catastrophe victims),9 or conducting familial 
searching or paternity tests.10 Th e development of forensic genetics, especially the 
fact that genetic material can now be derived from small amount of samples, also 
enables the reopening of old so-called »cold cases«. Not only do these databases con-
tribute to the fi nding of perpetrators, but may also clear convicts.11
Digitalized DNA profi les enable the tracing of suspects, the identifi cation of vic-
tims, and sometimes also missing persons. Th e digitalized profi les are a suffi  cient 
means to achieve these aims, however beside the profi les samples are also stored for 
a number of purposes, such as retesting, quality control, submission to updated 
technology, etc.
Samples include skin cells, hair, blood, saliva, buccal swab, semen, etc. Th ey are 
typically frozen at low temperatures (for example in case of blood banks -80 ˚C), 
other sampling techniques allow storage at room temperature.12
Data include the DNA profi les on the one hand, and on the other a number of per-
sonal data, depending on the jurisdiction. Th ese latter may include name, maiden 
name, mother’s maiden name, place and date of birth, address, sex, in some coun-
tries physical appearance, ethnic origin, the person and/or the laboratory who/
where the sample has been taken, the type and method of testing, etc. 
Current research enables forensic experts to derive profi les from very small samples. 
Once a match is found this does not automatically serve as conclusive evidence of 
guilt, fi rst because a match does not prove but only that someone was present at a 
crime scene, and second due to the fact that forensic experts can only tell the prob-
9 Andrea Piccinini, Ferruccio Betti, M. Capra, Cristina Cattaneo, Th e identifi cation of the victims of the Lin-
ate air crash by DNA analysis, in Progress in Forensic Genetics 10, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004, 39-41; T. Bille, R. 
Wingrove, M. Holland, C. Holland, C. Cave, J. Schumm and Th e Staff  of Th e Bode Technology Group, Novel 
method of DNA extraction from bones assisted DNA identifi cation of World Trade Center victims, in Progress 
in Forensic Genetics 10, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004, 553; Martin Steinlechner, Walther Parson, Walter Rabl, Petra 
Grubwieser and Richard Scheithauer, Tsunami-disaster: DNA typing of Sri Lanka victim samples and related AM 
matching procedures, in Progress in Forensic Genetics 11 - Proceedings of the 21st International ISFG Congress held in 
Ponta Delgada, Th e Azores, Portugal between 13 and 16 September 2005, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006, 741-743. 
10 In the present analysis the focus is on forensic databanks established for crime prevention and prosecution 
purposes, therefore identifi cation of mass catastrophe victims or the establishment of paternity falls outside the 
scope of the paper. 
11 In the US Innocent project 238 convicted persons have proved to be innocent on the basis of the technique of 
forensic genetics. http://innocentproject.org/ 
12 Robert F. Weir and Robert S. Olick, Th e stored tissue issue, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 79.
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ability that a certain DNA profi le belongs to a given individual. Th ird, there is the 
possibility of human error, as always. 
In theory it would be suffi  cient to store the profi les derived from DNA electronical-
ly, and not keeping the samples. National data protection rules however do not 
seem to regulate this: even the data protection rules seem to apply to the profi les, 
and not to the samples.13 In the lack of a common regulation, Member States’ regu-
lations greatly diff er on this matter as well. Belgium, Germany, Lithuania, Sweden 
destroy the samples once the DNA profi les have been created, while in Hungary or 
Malta the period for which samples are stored depends on the crime committed by 
the convict, whereas in some Member States like in the UK samples are stored in-
defi nitely. As to the DNA profi les, many more Member States allow indefi nite re-
tention, which seems to be disproportionate in light of the above Marper decision 
of the European Court of Human Rights.
A forensic DNA typically contains crime scene samples, samples and profi les of 
convicts and suspects, sometimes also of victims, volunteers, or missing persons. 
Crime scene samples are the least problematic ones from the point of view of bodily 
integrity, as the retention of such samples does not necessitate invasion into the 
body, however minor. As to suspects and convicts the case is rather diff erent. As op-
posed to classical medical or population biobanks, persons suspected of having 
committed certain crimes are typically not free to opt not to have their samples tak-
en. Sample taking is intrusion into spatial privacy or bodily integrity, however mi-
nor (like in case of buccal swab, or saliva) and in the majority of the Member States 
even coercion may be used to acquire samples. 
In medical research, i.e. in case of classical biobanking this problem is solved by in-
formed consent, i.e. persons whose samples enter a database agree to sample taking 
and data retention and processing with the possibility of withdrawal any time, with-
out any reason. As a compensation for the lack of consent and the fact that force 
may be used against people who are supposed to be presumed innocent, in some 
Member States a court order or the permission of high ranked policepersons needs 
to be acquired. 
In most of the jurisdictions there is a list of crimes or types of crimes the perpetra-
tors of which are obliged to give samples. Other states argue that those committing 
serious crimes had already committed minor ones, therefore it is advisable to ex-
pand the list of off ences. Germany took a more balanced approach and perpetrators 
committing minor off ences are only obliged to give samples if they are recidivists. 
13 Nathan Van Camp and Kris Dierickx, »National Forensic DNA Databases – Socio-Ethical Challenges and 
Current Practices in the EU,« European Ethical-Legal Papers No 9, Leuven, 2007, 25.
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A further distinction shall be made between those suspected and those sentenced. 
Persons suspected against whom charges have been dropped or whose criminal lia-
bility has not been established in a judicial process under due process shall be pre-
sumed to be innocent. Retaining their data therefore is highly problematic, stigma-
tizing them, and if we consider that disproportionately more charges are taken and 
dropped in case of certain minority groups,14 their discrimination will be reinforced 
by their overrepresentation in the forensic database. 
At the same time some problems may arise also in relation to sample taking from 
convicts. If we accept that the sole aim of a forensic databank is the identifi cation of 
persons who had committed crimes, the question arises why to take the sample 
from convicts already found and proven to be guilty. Th e only objective – beside the 
very technical consideration of checking the system and its upgrades – must then be 
to catch these individuals more effi  ciently if they commit further crimes. In this case 
however it needs to be proven that convicts are likely to engage in criminal activity 
after the perpetration of the fi rst committed crimes as well. When relying on statis-
tical fi ndings it is worth diff erentiating between fi rst off enders and recidivists, as 
their recidivism rates may be diff erent. Even if a correlation can be found between 
fi rst and second or multiple off ending, after a certain period the likelihood that 
someone engages in further crimes, diminishes. Since criminal activity is typical for 
a certain age range, it might seem disproportionate keep data and/or samples of 
people who have once been convicted for decades. Th is is especially true for minor 
crimes.
A forensic database may also have the severe side eff ect of hitting disproportionately 
hard on persons belonging to a certain underrepresented ethnic origin or to a given 
social class – characteristics that may be searched for and indicated in the UK’s ND-
NAD. Searching for close matches to information derived from a crime scene sam-
ple may result in the fi nding of relatives of perpetrators. Such familial searching 
however is highly problematic, as biologically related persons to perpetrators – in 
some jurisdiction including minors – become automatically suspect, eventually stig-
matised. It is to be noted that the age of culpability is diff erent in the EU’s Member 
States, and in the UK for example the age of criminal liability, i.e. the age limit for 
entering someone’s data into the NDNAD is 10 years.
Children and other vulnerable groups are typically granted higher protection in case 
of medical genetic research and data sampling or storage; in some cases retention of 
14 E.g. in the male population of the United States of America 92 % of African Americans prove to be innocent as 
compared to the 62 % in case of Caucasian American citizens; in the European context almost two third of samples 
stored in the NDNAD belong to black men as opposed to 8 % of the samples taken from white men. Mairi Levitt, 
Forensic databases: benefi ts and ethical social costs, 83 British Medical Bulletin 1, 235-248 (2007), 242
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data is entirely impermissible. As the Romanian Constitutional Court held in a re-
cent decision,15 the fact that samples are taken from persons between 14-18 years of 
age, i.e. from persons culpable, but still minors with the meaning of the Children’s 
Rights Convention is not per se unconstitutional. However, at the international lev-
el, the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency warn 
against labelling and stigmatising a young person as »deviant,« »delinquent« or »pre-
delinquent.«16 Nevertheless in the NDNAD alone there were in 2006 40.000 peo-
ple under 18 years of age who have never committed a crime.17 Th ere is no reason to 
disregard the need for greater safeguards in the criminal context, which raises even-
tually equally or more serious concerns as to human rights, since highly sensitive 
and possibly stigmatising data that may also distort the relation between the state 
and the individual, and that may result in self-fulfi lling prophecies, are involved. 
Based on the fi nding of our research, the following good practices may be formulat-
ed in the regulation of forensic databases.
1. Th e objectives of the forensic biobanks shall be clearly regulated. Th e branch of 
law to regulate the issue of forensic databases shall be clarifi ed. Diff erent pur-
poses shall be regulated by laws belonging to diff erent branches of law, and 
these rules shall be clearly separated. 
2. Samples and profi les shall be clearly distinguished. Diff erent rules shall apply to 
the storage of samples and profi les. Th ey shall satisfy the requirements as laid 
down in binding international instruments and in the soft laws. Most impor-
tantly storage shall satisfy the test developed by the European court of Human 
Rights.
3. Sample taking shall be safeguarded by human rights guarantees. We do ac-
knowledge that the requirement of consent is impracticable in the criminal con-
text, but as a compensation preferably a judicial decision hall be needed for 
sample taking.
4. Th e purpose of the law – especially in the criminal context – shall be clearly de-
fi ned. Should the main purpose be identifi cation of perpetrators, the legislative 
has to give reasons as to why to take the samples from convicts after they have 
already been convicted – a practice in many jurisdictions.
15 Decision No. 485/2009 on the constitutionality of Article 5 Section (3) of the Law No. 76/2008 on the Orga-
nizing and Functioning of the National Judicial Genetic Data System
16 FN 25 in Mairi Levitt, Forensic databases: benefi ts and ethical social costs, 83 British Medical Bulletin 1, 235-
248 (2007)
17 Th e DNA database and you, http://rinf.com/alt-news/surveillance-big-brother/the-dna-database-and-you/4820/ 
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5. Th e list of crimes for which samples are to be taken shall be laid down by law. 
Preferably only perpetrators or suspects of the more severe crimes shall be sub-
jected to sample taking, or recidivists. Whenever irrelevant, like in economic 
crimes, sample taking shall not be required.
6. Samples and profi les shall be stored for defi nite periods. We do acknowledge 
that the deletion of samples is impracticable, since it is essential to have samples 
available for retesting in case the tests or their methods are being disputed in a 
case, further quality control necessitates their storage, and fi nally, as technology 
develops, samples may be submitted to retesting again and again, and it may be 
impractical to recreate the database each time a new technological method has 
been invented. Nevertheless since they contain information irrelevant for iden-
tifi cation purposes they shall preferably deleted once the profi les are derived 
therefrom or when a fi nal decision has been rendered in the given case.
7. Th ere shall be deadlines for the deletion of the profi les as well. Th ese shall de-
pend on the gravity of the crime. Samples and profi les of persons not found 
guilty shall be immediately destroyed and deleted respectively.
8. Th e scope of persons having access to samples and profi les shall be laid down by 
law.
9. Data transfer shall happen through secured means.
10. Sample taking, storage and erasure shall be monitored. 
11. Forensic databased must never be interconnected with other databases, and es-
pecially not with population or classical biobanks.
12. Special regard shall be given to the right of children and other vulnerable 
groups.
13. A right to judicial remedy against sample and profi le storage shall be guaranteed.
14. Unifi cation of data protection standards across Europe would be the sine qua 
non of criminal cooperation. Without suffi  cient and uniform human rights 
mechanism the transfer of profi les remains highly problematic.
